Uncertain future risks pose cognitive and analytical challenges. Low probability events coupled with potentially severe outcomes pose well-known problems for decision making and are also prone to public overreactions. Imprecision in risk estimates generates behavioral biases such as ambiguity aversion. Policy prescriptions to adopt conservative values and to undertake "no regrets" policies institutionalize these biases. The emphasis instead should be on reaping the potential gains from exploiting risk ambiguity and opportunities for learning about uncertain risks. Simple guidelines such as recommendations for less ambitious investments in the presence of irreversible effects also may have restricted applicability. Standard discounting procedures without any adjustment for temporally remote effects can properly weight future benefits and costs.
Distant risks often pose considerable cognitive and practical challenges, three of which will be the focus of this article. First, as discussed in Section 2, many potentially severe risk outcomes may involve small probabilities. Making sensible decisions when dealing with very small risks is especially difficult and may create inordinate pressures for regulatory intervention. Second, because of the future nature of the risk, the informational basis for forming precise risk assessments may be very limited. As a result, there is often tremendous ambiguity regarding the risk and its consequences. This ambiguity-which is the focus of Section 3-in turn has led to seemingly sensible but ultimately misguided prescriptions, e.g., it is better to be safe than sorry, to be conservative when dealing with risks of harmful events, and to pursue policies for which we will have no regrets. In each instance, these prescriptions are the opposite of what policymakers should seek to achieve. Third, the future aspect of the risk makes the discounting of these remote effects of substantial consequence and an integral part of any responsible assessment of benefits and costs. Section 4 examines the importance of maintaining the application of responsible discounting policies even for very temporally remote impacts. Section 5 concludes.
Much of the impetus for risk regulation stems from the public pressures generated by the alarmist response to publicized future threats, many of which involve low probabilities. These risks often have three critical dimensions. First, because the risks often pertain to new hazards that impose expected losses, the psychological biases involving loss aversion come into play. The accustomed risk level has risen, which the public views as a greater risk change than altering the risk a comparable amount from a different baseline (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Viscusi, Magat, and Huber 1987) . Second, very small probabilities concerning risks called to the public's attention tend to be overestimated (Fischhoff et al. 1981) . Third, if small risks are coupled with potentially severe consequences, people may focus on the adverse outcome and lack the capability to incorporate very small probabilities into a sound assessment of the expected losses involved (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) . These concerns with respect to the level of the risk all come into play in driving the public's support for risk regulation, which in turn creates pressures for government agencies to intervene even for minor hazards.
In this section I illustrate the tendency to overreact to small probability risks by summarizing the results of three surveys of the public's willingness to pay for policies to eliminate very small drinking water risks. The new empirical results reported here are based on nationally representative samples using Knowledge Network web-based surveys that Joel Huber, Jason Bell, and I undertook for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 2008. The three risks considered are the risks from prescription drugs in drinking water, the presence of the herbicide atrazine in drinking water, and chemicals from water bottles made of bisphenol-a (BPA). For each of these, the survey informed the respondents of the information concerning the nature of the risk and then elicited their willingness to pay to eliminate the risk.
The presence of prescription drugs in drinking water received substantial media attention around the time of the survey and has been the focus of more recent media coverage with respect to the presence of opioids in mussels. 3 The survey informed respondents: "Recent tests conducted by a national news organization found small amounts of prescription drugs in drinking water used by over 40 million Americans. These drugs included painkillers, birth control hormones, and antibiotics. Scientists do not know whether the small doses of these chemicals could cause serious health risks." Groups of the 4,968 survey respondents who considered this risk were offered a single referendum choice involving different annual costs to eliminate the risks ranging from $50 to $250. Based on the interval regression estimates for the range in which their willingness-to-pay amount fell, the mean annual willingness to pay for eliminating the prescription drug risk was $130.51.
A different sample of 2,969 adult respondents considered similar valuations of the risks posed by the herbicide atrazine in drinking water. The survey text noted: "Between 2003 and 2008, tests in Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, and Ohio found high concentrations of the weed killer atrazine in drinking water. Atrazine is believed to interfere with the body's natural production of hormones, and has caused birth defects in laboratory tests on animals." The survey included an additional question pertaining to whether they thought the chemical exposed risks to them. Only 15% of the sample indicated "Yes" regarding their personal risk exposure, and the most common responses were that 48% of the sample indicated that they were not sure if the chemical posed risks to them and the 37% who did not think atrazine posed a risk to them. Nevertheless, based on responses to a referendum question involving annual costs from $25 to $100 per year, the mean estimated annual household willingness to pay for a filter that would ensure that this chemical was not in their drinking water was $142. 56. 4 A third sample of 996 respondents considered the risks posed by plastic water bottles containing BPA. The survey informed respondents: "The United States and Canadian governments may declare some plastic water bottles as toxic. These bottles can release a chemical called bisphenola into the water inside. This chemical has been shown to cause urinary tract problems and affect hormone levels in laboratory animals even at low levels of exposure." With respect to whether respondents thought that bottles with BPA posed a risk to them, 53% were not sure, 27% indicated "Yes," and 20% indicated "No." Despite the low level of risk awareness, the mean annual valuation of elimination of the risk was $80.04 based on the monthly amount that respondents were willingness to pay, with choices ranging from $1 to $20. Once again, despite the sense that there was little perceived threat of the risk to them, households were willing to contribute to efforts to eliminate the risk.
To put these willingness-to-pay values in perspective, a useful metric is to calculate what risk of death would warrant comparable willingness-to-pay amounts. If we assume that the value of a statistical life is $10 million (Viscusi 2018) , then these willingness-to-pay levels would be warranted for a fatality risk of 1.3 × 10 -5 for the prescription drug risk, 1.4 × 10 -5 for the atrazine risk, and 8.2 × 10 -6 for the BPA risk. In each instance, the underlying implied risk level is about a 1/100,000 annual risk of death for these valuations to be reasonable. Fatality risks of 1/100,000 would imply an annual U.S. death toll from each of these risks equal to 3,268. To put this death toll in perspective, it is over half of the total number of occupational fatalities from all causes. Such adverse health impacts for each of these drinking water risks appear to be substantially out of line with current risk estimates.
Available evidence regarding these dimly understood risks suggests that the actual risks are very low. As a result, it is very difficult for the public to conceptualize a meaningful risk-money tradeoff. Although media coverage has sounded the alarm for prescription drugs in drinking water, 5 the comprehensive review by the World Health Organization (2011) found no compelling rationale for additional treatment measures. Pharmaceuticals are sometimes present in drinking water, but the dosages are very low, typically more than 1,000-fold below the minimum therapeutic dose. Chlorination and other common drinking water treatment methods remove about half of the drugs, but achieving high removal rates requires more advanced water treatment processes such as advanced oxidation technologies that are also much more expensive. Given the unlikelihood of exposures posing any significant risks, the substantial costs of more aggressive removal efforts, and the presence of other waterborne hazards that merit policy attention, the World Health Organization did not recommend policy action to reduce risks from prescription drugs in drinking water. To date, there has been no EPA policy to regulate these risks.
Atrazine also has been the subject of media coverage 6 and analysis by the World Health Organization (2003) . EPA has undertaken an ongoing registration review of atrazine and has implemented an ecological exposure monitoring program. 7 The monitoring effort monitors about 150 drinking water systems, with the intensity of monitoring varying seasonally and based on history of atrazine use. Potential policy actions include induction into the intensive monitoring program, implementation of a mitigation plan, and banning the use of atrazine in the water system's watershed. Thus, the policy response has been very limited and is a targeted effort.
The regulation of plastic bottles and other products also has been more selective. In the year of the survey, Canada became the first country to ban the use of BPA in baby bottles. 8 In 2012 the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) banned the use of BPA in baby bottles and sippy cups, and 11 states have banned the use of BPA in specified food and drink containers, such as pacifiers and reusable food and drink containers. 9 Given the absence of evidence of reliable studies indicating risks for low-dose exposures to BPA, EPA indicated that even the risks for infants and young children are below the potential health effects level, but Canada undertook its ban on BPA "as a precautionary measure." 10 In this situation of risk ambiguity coupled with belief that the magnitude of the risk is low, the FDA, U.S. state governments, and Canada have chosen to regulate the risk based on the possible presence of some risk evidence rather than a determination that the magnitude of the risk was great and that the benefits of regulation exceeded the costs. That the exposures are to infants and young children was a prominent concern that no doubt contributed to the regulatory measure and its focused nature.
Consequently, there have been some limited policy initiatives for two of the three low probability drinking water risks addressed in the survey. The only exception is for the risks posed by pharmaceuticals in drinking water, for which there has been no policy initiative to decrease these exposures. In this instance, the assessed risks are quite small, and the costs of the possibly effective policy remedies are extremely high. There are also no public analyses that have demonstrated that the benefits exceed the costs for the atrazine and BPA policy actions. However, in these instances the policy remedies are more feasible but thus far have been far more limited than the proposed efforts to eliminate the risks that garner public support.
The absence of more substantial policy initiatives indicates that there are potentially considerable public pressures for eliminating risks, but they do not always result in aggressive policy action. With over 100 million U.S. households who on average are willing to pay about $100 to eliminate each of these risks, there would be substantial willingness to pay of over $100 million for policies if there were feasible policy options. Fortunately, the limits on potentially effective policy responses have reined in potential interventions. Nevertheless, in many situations the overreaction to negligible risks can lead to policies for which there is an inappropriate benefit-cost balance. For example, consider the median cost per case of cancer prevented for a sample of 99 EPA Superfund sites. Hazardous waste sites usually rank near the top of the public's environmental concerns. Even using EPA's conservative upper-bound risk assumptions, the expected cost per cancer case at this set of sites is $10.9 billion (2017$) (Hamilton and Viscusi 1999) , or roughly 1,000 times the pertinent economic value of preventing an expected case of cancer. The public's tendency to overreact to small identified risks can create pressures for policy actions, particularly when they are not required to pass a benefit-cost test.
Many risks have magnitudes that are highly uncertain, which is often referred to as risk ambiguity. This ambiguity may be quite common for very small probabilities, such as the drinking water risks, since it would take a large informational base to pin down these risks with precision. But there also may be substantial ambiguity with respect to more substantial risks for which there is less familiarity. After the 9/11 attack, the assessed probability of future terrorist attacks rose, but how high should the assessment of the subsequent risk be?
These types of risk assessment issues may pose practical problems for government agencies that must make policy decisions in situations in which they may not have precise understanding of the magnitude of the risk or the incremental effect of the policy. If we relax the TSA airport screening requirements, what will be the effect on safety? Review of regulatory impact analyses for major regulations reveals many instances in which there are no precise risk reduction values to assign in assessing the efficacy of a policy in contexts such as homeland security, food safety, and risk communication regulations, among others. Homeland security risks pose challenges since the Department of Homeland Security does not believe that it can provide objective assessments of the safety impact of policies since, in the agency's view, historical data on terrorist attacks cannot be used to reliably estimate current risks or to estimate the marginal impact of proposed regulations such as document requirements. 11 With respect to food safety, the USDA did not provide a quantitative assessment of the risk reduction effects of regulating beef products to reduce the human risks of mad cow disease since the USDA did not know how BSE causes disease in humans. 12 Similarly, the FDA did not venture a risk assessment with respect to the regulation of selenium in infant formula. 13 For the risk communication regulation for sunscreen, the FDA similarly did not estimate the magnitude of the risk but claimed that the regulation "should contribute to reduced exposure to UVB and UVA radiation and thereby reduce the incidence of skin cancer." 14 Even in situations in which agencies are able to provide a concrete estimate of the risk, the risk range may be considerable. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2014) estimates that there is a broad range of possible temperature increases between now and the end of the century. 15 Any such estimates are, of course, complicated by uncertainties regarding future policy and behavioral responses. But even nearer-term air pollution risks may be highly uncertain. Krutilla, Good, and Graham (2015) document the substantial range of uncertainty in the benefits from a large set of federal air quality regulations. Recent regulatory analyses also indicate broad ranges. EPA estimated the reduction in premature mortality from controlling emissions from glider vehicles to range from 350 to 1,600. 16 Given that there are often substantial risk ambiguities in the underlying scientific evidence, one would also expect the public to have highly uncertain risk beliefs. For example, after the 9/11 attack, surveys of Harvard and Wharton students assessed the number of deaths in the coming year that would result from foreign terrorist attacks involving airplanes or other threats (Viscusi and Zeckhauser 2005) . Their lower-bound estimate at the 5th percentile of the distribution had a median value of 5 deaths and mean value of 80 deaths. Their upper-bound values at the 95th percentile had a median value of 3,000 deaths and a mean value of 28,762 deaths. The 50th percentile values had a median of 100 and mean of 396. These broad ranges understate the diffuseness of individual judgments since they exclude the 2.4% of the sample who envisioned a death toll in excess of 1 million. Even if the government seeks to stabilize risk beliefs around official risk estimates, in the presence of the risk debate involving conflicting experts, there will be a tendency for beliefs to be highly imprecise and to gravitate to the worst-case scenario (Viscusi 1997) .
The policy ramifications of uncertainty take on additional importance if the adverse policy outcomes are potentially catastrophic. Many outcomes are in line with past patterns of behavior and the potential use of normal distributions to characterize such behavior, as in the case of annual motor-vehicle fatality rates. However, in some instances, there may be extreme events such as black swans or loss outliers that can only be accounted for if the distribution of outcomes is a fattailed distribution rather than a less skewed normal distribution (Taleb 2007; Weitzman 2011; Dudley et al. 2018 ). The possibility of extreme events that can be characterized using fat-tailed distributions is not mere conjecture. The distribution of financial damages stemming from oil spills, such as BP's Deepwater Horizon spill, has a fat-tailed distribution (Viscusi and Zeckhauser 2011) . Similarly, estimates of the distribution of large punitive damages awards is best estimated by fitting a fat-tailed distribution to these awards so as to account for the infrequent possibilities of multi-billion dollar awards (McMichael and Viscusi 2014).
How the public and government officials react to situations of ambiguity is likely to be governed by the well-established behavioral economics phenomenon known as ambiguity aversion (Ellsberg 1961; Machina and Siniscalchi 2014) . Suppose that there are two possible gambles involving the chance of winning some prize. With the certainty option 1, there is a precisely known 0.5 probability of winning the prize. With the uncertain option 2, the player has a subjective probability belief that the chance of winning the prize is also 0.5, but the probability is highly uncertain and could be higher or lower than 0.5. If the game is played only a single time, the player should be indifferent to the options 1 and 2, treating a subjective probability and equivalent objective probability as equivalent. However, a large literature has documented a preference for the precisely known probability. Indeed, even some certain chances of success below 0.5 are preferred to the subjective probability of success of 0.5. This ambiguity aversion for the chance of winning a prize also carries over in many situations to losses as well (Machina and Siniscalchi 2014) . This avoidance of uncertain probabilities carries over to situations in which there is the potential for learning. When dealing with uncertain risks, ambiguous probabilities offer the greatest opportunities for learning and adaptive behavior. Consider the following two-period example. Suppose that a successful outcome has a payoff of 1 and that there are two periods. If the player chooses the certain probability option 1 in both periods, the total expected payoff is 0.5 + 0.5 = 1. Now consider the uncertain option 2 in the situation in which there is the opportunity to switch if experiences are unfavorable. Let the assessed probability for the uncertain option 2 be governed by a uniform beta distribution. The expected initial expected payoff is 0.5. If the outcome is unsuccessful in the first period, the probability of success in round 2 is reduced to 0.33, making it desirable to switch to the certain option 1. If, however, the first round is successful, the assessed probability of success on option 2 rises to 0.67, making it desirable to stick with the uncertain option 2. The expected payoff over both periods for the uncertain option 2 coupled with adaptive behavior that switches to option 1 after an unfavorable outcome consequently is 0.5 + [0.5 × 0.5 + 0.5 × 0.67] = 1.09.
The underlying principle in this example carries over to many policy contexts as well. In situations of uncertainty about the level of the risk, the optimal strategy often involves choosing the uncertain policy option, learning about the risk based on the experience, and adaptive behavior that involves switching to other policies if the outcomes with the uncertain choice are sufficiently unfavorable (Dudley et al. 2018; Yakowitz 1969) . The gains are particularly great for highly ambiguous risks so that there should be a preference for ambiguity rather than aversion in these multi-period contexts.
This learning situation in which unsuccessful outcomes impose no long-term adverse consequences of course does not involve dire outcomes so that the experimentation process permits switching after an unsuccessful outcome. Consider the extreme experimentation situation in which an unsuccessful outcome is terminal, as is the case for lotteries involving life and death or some catastrophic environmental calamity. In effect, this termination of the multi-period decision is an extreme form of irreversibility. Since there is no opportunity to switch after an adverse outcome, is there still a rationale for preferring the uncertain choice? The certain option 1 offers expected rewards over the two periods of 0.5 + 0.5 × 0.5 = 0.75. However, the uncertain option 2 offers expected rewards of 0.5 + 0.5 × 0.67 = 0.84. Increased ambiguity of the risk probability boosts the chance for long-term survival because the uncertain probabilities are revised upwards after a success, and the game ends after an unsuccessful outcome. Even if the learning process is costly and in the extreme case in which there is no opportunity for adaptive behavior and switching choices after acquiring adverse risk information, risk ambiguity is a desirable feature in multiperiod choice situations such as those likely to involve deep uncertainty (Viscusi 1979) .
While risk ambiguity is a neutral in single-period choice situations and a desirable feature in multiperiod situations, a common policy treatment of risk ambiguity is to avoid situations involving ambiguous risks. A frequently advocated policy approach is that of risk conservatism or precautionary principles in which the risk assessment utilizes measures of the upper bound of the risk distribution such as the 95th percentile or the highest concentration level of a chemical. 17 Although adherents to this approach may provide intuitively appealing rationales, such as that "it is better to be safe than sorry," there is no analytic justification for these kinds of biases (Cameron and Abouchar 1991; Sunstein 2003) .
Nevertheless, there are frequent examples of such ambiguity-averse practices in governmental analyses. The pivotal dose-response relationships for inhalation risk exposures at Superfund sites are based on "the upper bound excess lifetime cancer risk estimated to result from continuous exposure to an agent at a concentration of 1 μg/m 3 in air." 18 Even setting aside the upper-bound aspect of dose-response relationships, Hamilton and Viscusi (1999) found that assessment of the risks posed by Superfund sites often rely on upper-bound parameters or exposure amounts as part of the risk assessment. In assessing risks of contaminated fish, EPA recommends a focus on "highend values" and analyses "designed to provide maximum protection against underestimating risk." 19 A similar approach was adopted in an analysis prepared for the FDA to assess the risks of contamination of fish after the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill. The study also focused on "conservative estimates," "upper bound consumer lifetime cancer risk," and a "[b]ias toward safety" (Dickey 2012) . In its assessment of the social cost of carbon, the Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases (2016), prepared estimates using discount rates of 2.5%, 3%, and 5%, but only did a sensitivity analysis for differences in risk levels at the upper tail without showing the counterpart results for the lower tail of the risk distribution. For example, in the year 2050, at a 3% discount rate the social cost of carbon (in 2007$) would be $69, but at the 95th percentile it would be $212. The report did not provide the values at the 5th percentile.
Just as some policy advocates recommend the "better to be safe than sorry" approach to risk ambiguity, there also is a similar concern for conservative policies with respect to what might be termed the "no regrets" approach (Adler et al. 2000; Siegel and Jorgensen 2013) . Unlike the ambiguity aversion guidance, there are some circumstances in which the "no regrets" procedure is economically warranted when dealing with economic irreversibilities. It should be noted that the discussion thus far has not excluded the role of irreversible effects since the termination of the sequential decisions after an unsuccessful outcome is an extreme form of irreversibility.
The basic model underlying the "no regrets" approach was developed by Arrow and Fisher (1974) . Consider a development situation in which the benefits of future environmental preservation might have either a high or low value in the future. Erring on the side of underdevelopment relative to what one would do based on the average predicted future value of preservation is desirable because it preserves future options. One can undertake additional development in the future if the benefit of preservation is low, and if the benefit of preservation is high, then having not undertaken substantial development will have proven to be a value-maximizing decision.
While this result is correct, it would be erroneous to conclude that the presence of possible irreversibilities always makes underinvestment desirable. Whether underinvestment is appropriate or not depends on the structure of the irreversibility, how costly it is to alter the investment, and how these costs affect future decisions to decrease or increase the policy investment (Viscusi 1988) . If there are fixed costs associated with altering the investment in the future, then it may be desirable to invest more now, rather than less. For example, we may want to build larger bridges over interstate highways to accommodate the potential addition of an additional lane of traffic. Another situation in which overinvestment is warranted is when current policy investments are irreversible and there are rising benefits over time rather than declining benefits. In that situation, it is desirable to undertake a more ambitious policy investment at the present time than would be warranted based on the current benefit levels. Depending on the nature of the irreversibility and the temporal pattern of costs and benefits, erring on the side of caution when dealing with situations involving irreversibilities may be the opposite of the policy prescription that will maximize net social benefits.
Policies involving uncertain futures necessarily will involve future benefits and/or future costs that must be made comparable to current resource allocations using discounting methods. If r is the rate of discount, then policy impacts in year n are divided by (1 + r) n to convert them to present values. Based on the principal discount rate used in U.S. policy assessments of 3%, the present value of $1 in benefits occurring next year is $0.97. The present value drops to $0.55 if the benefit is in 20 years, $0.23 if the benefit is in 50 years, $0.05 if the benefit is in 100 years, and $1.45 × 10 -13 if the benefit is in 1,000 years. There is an inexorable shrinking of the present value of future benefits as the time period extends farther into the future. Simply not liking the answer that is generated by discounting properly is not a sound rationale for abandoning conventional discounting practices.
Even with proper discounting of distant impacts, benefit levels need not shrink as dramatically as this discount factor trajectory. Underlying the existence of discount rates is that there is capital and labor productivity, making society wealthier over time. If there is a positive income elasticity with respect to the benefit component, the unit benefit values will also be increasing over time at some growth rate g. Because benefits are also increasing, the pertinent net discount rate that accounts for the effect of the rising level of incomes on policy benefits is approximately (1 + rg) n . An annual growth rate g in benefit values of 2% would consequently lead to a net discount rate of 1% so that policy impacts in 100 years would have a weight of 0.37 rather than 0.05.
Such adjustments for rising benefit values reduce but do not eliminate the effect of discounting on future benefits. Advocates of policies with distant benefits may seek a lower discount rate such as zero, or a figure very close to zero. Stern (2007) used a discount rate of 0.1% in the analysis of the economics of climate change, though other climate change policy advocates have recommended higher discount rates. 20
Failure to discount at all by using a zero discount rate generates a variety of undesirable effects. First is the consequence that I refer to as the "permanent cost slam dunk." In a world with no discounting, a $1 loss forever will have an infinite present value, swamping any finite amount of benefits and leading to policy paralysis. Second, if the discount rate is zero and policy options remain unchanged over time, it will always be desirable to defer policies and never take action in the current time period. Not spending the money now will make it possible to invest the money now, earn a rate of return on that investment, and still be able to obtain the same value of benefits and costs at some future date while reaping the rewards of the investment. Third, zero discounting places inordinate weight on providing benefits to future generations, who will be more affluent than current generations given the rising income levels over time. Zero discounting consequently will increase intergenerational income inequality.
Instead of adopting a zero discount rate, perhaps instead one might use the standard discount rate r for the current generation and a discount rate r' for effects on future generations, where r > r'. Suppose that within their generations, both the current and the future generations have a discount rate of r rather than r'. Then our use of a lower discount rate r' for future generations will place inordinate weight on very distant impacts relative to the value that the future generations themselves place on such effects. The subsequent policy distortions will lead to policy outcomes that are not consistent with the within-generation intertemporal preferences that future generations would have with respect to impacts on their generation.
Concern with distant future generations is not a philosophical abstraction. In its analysis of the merits of storing nuclear wastes in Yucca Mountain, Nevada, EPA used a time frame of 10,000 years, which is longer than the entire period of recorded human history. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled against the agency, concluding that 10,000 years was too short a period to consider. 21 At a 3% interest rate, the pertinent discount factor in 10,000 years is 4.2 × 10 -129 , so that even very catastrophic effects would drop out of any benefit-cost analysis. Technological advances over the next 100 centuries that enhance our ability to limit any harms from nuclear waste also highlight the unreasonableness of the Court's approach of insisting on a radiation exposure limit that is less than half of the natural radiation exposure in high altitude cities such as Denver (Viscusi 2018) .
Despite substantial advances in benefit-cost practices for risk and environmental regulations, uncertain future risks continue to pose considerable policy hurdles. Public overreactions to low probability risks may create pressures for agencies to devote resources to less consequential hazards. The substantial ambiguity that often accompanies temporally remote risks creates opportunities for learning and reaping possible benefits from potentially favorable probabilities that are encompassed in the range of possible risk levels. Policy guidance can exploit this potential, but simple rules of thumb, such as conservatism biases and "no regrets" policies, tilt decisions in ways that are opposite of the welfare-maximizing approach. Decisions with respect to risks that are both uncertain and may extend far into the future are intrinsically difficult. Continued adherence to sound analytic approaches such as the use of mean probability estimates and proper application of discounting provides the best framework for promoting social welfare.
